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Abstract 
In this paper, we aim to identify those network subgroups that enhance the collaborative governance in a focal 
buyer-supplier relationship. We argue, that partners in a focal buyer-supplier relationship can be seen as 
embedded in a broader network of business relationships with network subgroups, (e.g. other buyers, buyers 
customers), which provide information that can support the collaborative governance, assessed by norms of 
flexibility, joint planning and joint problem solving, by lowering the level of information asymmetry between the 
partners. Empirical evidence was gathered through a mailed questionnaire returned by 175 Dutch suppliers of 
potted plants and flowers. Our results show the importance of the information provided by the network subgroups 
to manage the focal buyer-supplier relationships and ultimately the impact on performance. Interestingly, 
although five network subgroups were mentioned in the questionnaire, suppliers only obtained reliable 
information for their focal relationship from the downstream subgroups of other buyers (i.e. merchant-distributors) 
and buyer’s customers (i.e. supermarkets and flower shops). In order to avoid redundancy, managers in seeking 
information in their business network should not consider the network as a whole, but rather the downstream 
subgroups.  
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1 Introduction  
In this article, we propose that considering network connections allows a more refined understanding 
of the relational governance of a buyer-supplier relationship in marketing channels. Previous studies 
have concentrated mainly on the organizational factors related specifically to the dyadic relationship -
e.g. on transaction specific investments (Dyer & Singer, 1998), trust (Anderson & Narus, 1990), 
commitment (Anderson & Weitz, 1989), opportunism (Stump & Heide, 1996), and on the exchange of 
information and data interchange between the partners (Morgan & Hunt, 1994, Kraut et al, 1999). 
Less attention has been directed to the influence of broader business networks on these dyadic 
relationships. These studies have focused on commitment (Blankenburg Holm, Eriksson & Johanson, 
1999), innovation (Hakanson, Havila & Pedersen, 1999) and contractual design (Antia & Frasier, 
2001).  However, so far no study has investigated whether the information provided by the network 
connections -other firms within a business network which are somehow connected to the exchange 
partners in a focal business relationship- would influence the extent of collaboration between the 
partners in a focal business relationship. Drawing on the work of Anderson, Hakanson and Johanson 
(1994) and Burt (1997), we argue, that partners in a focal buyer-supplier relationship can be seen as 
embedded in a broader network of business relationships with network subgroups, (e.g. other buyers, 
buyers customers), which provide information that can support the collaborative governance by 
lowering the level of information asymmetry between the partners. For instance, if a supplier has 
difficulties to set up the proper sales conditions or is concerned about the reputation of the 
counterpart, he can rely on the diligent information flows in the business network to make its decision. 
Certainly not all the network subgroups possess valuable information and firms are typically 
embedded in multiple, often overlapping set of relationships, so for managers seeking efficiency, it is 
central to maintain connections with those network subgroups that offer valuable information with no 
or limited redundancy. In this paper, we aim to determine the specific network subgroups, which 
provide valuable information that supports a focal business relationship in terms of its collaborative 
governance and ultimately its performance. In § 2 we discuss the theoretical background of the study 
and present the hypotheses. In § 3 we explain the research design and in § 4 the results are 
discussed. Finally, in § 5 the conclusions, managerial implications, and limitations and suggestions for 
further research are presented.  
 
2 Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
The research model presented in figure 1 is not a full representation of all the factors influencing a 
business relationship, but rather a set of hypotheses deduced from relevant characteristics of network 
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subgroups and the business relationship. We will elaborate on the background of the model, the 
selected variables and hypotheses, below. 
 
Fig. 1: Research Model 
  
 
Granovetter (1985) argues that information from a broader business network is valuable because it is 
relatively cheap, and creates consistency in the context surrounding a focal relationship. These 
informational benefits may include monitoring of actions of the counterpart by other connected firms 
e.g. as a safeguard against opportunistic behavior (Burt, 1997; Williamson, 1985), to improve the 
coordination of production processes (Hakansson & Snehota, 1995; Hakansson, et al, 1999), logistics 
(Gadde & Snehota, 2000), and the setting of a sales strategy (Wathne et al, 2001). Considering that 
there are innumerable potential connections with different organizations to be considered (Ritter, 
2000), a selection of the relevant network connection becomes vital. Following Burt’s (1980) 
suggestion to find a proper degree of actor aggregation, we decided to use the concept of network 
subgroups that refers to a number of organizations with the same function in the market. The 
subgroups can be not only the four subgroups located upstream (e.g. colleagues/competitors and 
input suppliers) and downstream the market (e.g. other buyers and buyers’ customers), but also the 
subgroup of third parties (e.g. mediation agents).  
Collaboration is a departure from the anchor point of discreteness that underlies spot market 
transactions to a relational exchange as the roles of supplier and buyer are no longer narrowly 
defined in terms of the simple transfer of ownership of products (Macneil, 1981). By focusing on 
relational exchange, collaboration entails the activities that are undertaken jointly rather than 
unilaterally (Heide, 1994; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995). Within the framework of relational 
governance we propose the following variables to be central: joint planning, joint problem solving and 
flexibility of adjustments. 
Joint planning refers to the joint activities by which future contingencies, and consequential duties 
and responsibilities in a relationship have been explicitly made ex-ante (Heide & John, 1990 and 
Heide & John, 1992). This is an action that is basically proactive in nature, which operates as aids or 
frames of reference rather than strict specification of duties as in a contract. Plans represent 
frameworks within which subsequent adaptations (e.g. joint problem solving) can and are expected to 
take place (Macneil, 1981). The supplier with good connections to downstream network subgroups is 
more likely to get information on new trends and new product demands, which may imply changes of 
the production and transportation processes, e.g. the joint planning of the focal business relationship.  
Joint problem solving refers to joint activities to resolve disagreements, technical failures and other 
unexpected situations (Lush & Brown, 1996; Heide & Miner, 1992). This is a reactive action in which 
firms are looking for mutually satisfactory solutions (Calantone, Graham & Wimsatt, 1998). Even 
though a reactive action in nature, firms often attempt to persuade each other to adopt particular 
solutions to the disagreement situation. In collaboration, these persuasive attempts are more 
constructive than coercive or dominative (Dwyer, Schurr & Oh, 1987). Joint problem solving can be 
influenced by the information of the network subgroups. Several problems in business relationships 
are related to the definition of sales conditions (Stern et al, 1996), and the resolution linked to the 
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problems is dependent on the information (Burt, 2001). The information gathered in the business 
network may support the negotiation on prices, quantities and quality of products. The problems 
related to production and logistic processes might have been faced by other network connections who 
can provide the partners with solutions to solve the problems.  
Flexibility of adjustments refers to the extent to which a partner shows a flexible response to 
changing circumstances (Heide, 1994). Flexibility is an essential relational norm (i.e. an expected 
pattern of behavior, see Macneil, 1978, p.854), which establishes the ground rules for the initial and 
future exchanges (Heide & John, 1992). Much of the motivation for exploring the network is centered 
at the new logic of production that requires flexibility, as opposed to mass production (Powell, 1990). 
Markets for standardized goods are saturated, while higher quality and more specialized goods attract 
consumers. To meet the demands of this changing market place, firms adopt new modes of 
organization that spread production across diversified inter-organizational linkages of other buyers, 
suppliers, brokers, and buyers’ customers. Flexibility is central in collaboration, since no plan can be 
implemented in full, and changes in circumstances occur (Macneil, 1981). Even the simple planning of 
delivery, quantities and qualities is subject to change and without flexibility of the partners it is quite 
likely that the relationship fails. Flexibility is necessary to cope with the changing circumstances that 
any supplier faces considering the complexity and risky nature of its processes, even more so in 
agriculture production, which is very dependent on such uncertain factors as the weather conditions. 
As problems emerge, the required flexibility   fosters teamwork between the partners.  
  Anderson & Narus (1990) found that firms engage in intensive collaboration with a mutual 
interest in finding ways to add value or saving costs and primarily to serve consumer needs, which in 
turn provide competitive advantage. The reasoning underlying the expected positive influence of the 
three dimensions of collaboration on performance is based on the reduction of transaction costs and 
achievement of mutual expectations. Therefore, the time and energy so often spent on trying to plan 
and work out problems without consulting the buyer is gained. Reviewing the above, we formulate the 
following hypotheses: There is a positive influence of the information provided by the network 
subgroups on relational governance in terms of joint planning (H1a), joint problem solving (H1b) and 
flexibility of adjustments (H1c). Flexibility of adjustments influences joint planning (H2) and joint 
problem solving (H3), positively, while relational governance influences the perceived satisfaction (H4) 
and flexibility of adjustments (H5) positively. 
 
3 Research Design   
A sample of suppliers of the Dutch potted plant and flower sector was used to test the hypotheses. 
This sector is one of the booming agribusiness sectors in the Netherlands, accounting for over 65 per 
cent of the total world potted plant and flower trade (Elshof, 1998). A specific interface in the sector 
was selected, namely the business relationships between suppliers and merchant-distributors. This 
was chosen because of the significant trade volume that goes via direct collaboration from suppliers 
to buyers via fixed lines, as apposed to the traditional auction clock transactions (i.e. resembles a 
pure spot market). The fixed lines currently represent over 50 per cent of the total sales of potted 
plants and flowers, as opposed to less than four percent about five years ago (Kalenzi, 2000). Our 
respondents (owners or managers of supplier companies) were asked to focus on the most important 
wholesaler (hereafter referred to as the selected buyer) in terms of sales via fixed lines in the previous 
year. Data were collected through the use of a written questionnaire. The study population consisted 
of 571 suppliers of potted plants and flowers. Our data collection effort yielded 202 responses, of 
which 27 were incomplete questionnaires and non-eligible companies, a response rate of 31%. 
Questions address the relationship between a supplier and its most important merchant-distributor in 
terms of purchases in the previous year. According to the extrapolation method (Armstrong & 
Overton, 1977), non-response bias did not appear to be a serious problem in our study. 
A panel with practitioners and business academics and a pre-test with five suppliers were 
used to develop the questions. We measured performance via perceived satisfaction and growth rate. 
Perceived satisfaction refers to the rating of the respondent’s satisfaction with its selected buyer 
(Bensaou & Venkatraman, 1995; Zaheer et al, 1998). Following Mohr & Speckman (1994) we used 
sales growth rate in the last three years as an objective measure for performance, while it was not 
possible to get reliable information on more direct measures, such as operating profit margin. 
Flexibility of adjustments is a set of items describing the parties’ expected flexibility in response to 
changing circumstances (Heide, 1994). Joint planning measures the extent to which future 
contingencies and consequential duties and responsibilities in a relationship have been made 
explicitly ex-ante (Heide & John, 1990; Heide & John, 1992). Joint problem solving refers to the 
behavior to the relationships that captures the degree of joint solutions to problems a supplier 
demonstrates toward the selected buyer (Heide & Miner, 1992; Lush & Brown, 1996). The 
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measurement instrument of network connection was developed on the basis of previous research 
(Anderson et al, 1994; Blankenburg et al, 1999). The measurement in those previous researches 
intended to capture the “general effect” of other relationships on the focal relationships. We then 
made two major adjustments to this instrument. First, we decided to include a third party (e.g. a 
mediator) as connection. Second, this measurement instrument captures the impact of five different 
types of informational benefits provided by five different connections that are called network 
subgroups. A network subgroup is a set of organizations with the same function in the market as 
perceived by the respondent. The subgroups are shown in fig. 2, which represent the ones located 
upstream (input suppliers and other supplier of potted plant products) and downstream (other buyers 
and buyers’ customers), and the third party (agents of the auction cooperatives). 
  
Fig. 2: Network subgroups (downstream network subgroups in dark gray) 
Respondents SelectedBuyer
OB 1
OB 3
OB 2
OB n
AC 1 AC 2 AC n
BC 1
BC 2
BC 3
BC n
IS 1
IS 3
IS 2
IS n
OPP 1
OPP 2
OPP n
 
AC: Agents of the auction cooperative; IS: Input suppliers; OPP: Other potted plant suppliers; BC: Buyers’ 
customers; OB: Other buyers.  
 
The network subgroup of input suppliers (IS) includes the suppliers of young plants and seeds, firms 
that supply fertilizers, chemical products, pots, vases, wood and other raw materials; that of other 
buyers (OB) includes wholesalers, flower exporters, cash and carries and garden centers; that of 
other potted plant supplier (OPP) includes the firms with similar products; that of the buyers’ 
customers (BC) includes supermarkets, flower shops and wholesalers abroad. The network subgroup 
of agents of the auction cooperative (AC) is composed of the agents of the mediation department of 
the auction cooperatives in the Netherlands, who have strong contacts with the suppliers and buyers 
in this study. The informational benefits of each network subgroup refer to the support for setting 
prices, setting quantities, coordination of production processes and logistic operations, and foreseeing 
future actions of the focal buyer.  
In order to test unidimensionality of the measurement instrument, an examination of the item 
intercorrelations was used to purify the reflective scales (i.e. flexibility of adjustments and joint 
problem solving). Although correlations between several network subgroups and the dimensions of 
collaboration are significantly positive, all of the correlations are below .60 (Churchill, 1979) assuring 
te reliability of the model. The hypotheses were tested based on structural equation modeling with 
Lisrel 8.50 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1996). To test for discriminant validity of these constructs, we 
conducted a confirmatory factor analysis model with the two constructs where one had its factor 
correlation fixed to unity (Steenkamp & Trijp, 1991). The unconstrained model provided a significantly 
superior fit, suggesting adequate discriminant validity between the constructs. The scale composite 
reliability values of the reflective scales all exceed the recommended value .70, which reflects the 
good quality of the measurement instruments.  
 
4 Results  
The results are provided in table 1. The structural model was judged to provide an acceptable 
goodness of fit indices as well as statistically not significant associated chi square value (χ2= 26.455, 
p=0.019, df=12). This judgment is based on meaningful interpretability of the model in terms of 
content and theory, the adequate value of  .929 for the normed fitted index (NFI), and the absence of 
normalized residuals with absolute values greater than 2.32. This judgment is supported further by a 
goodness of fit index (GFI) value of .972 and a standardized root mean square residues (RMSR) 
value of 0.048. In order to provide greater confidence to the results provided in table 1, we tested our 
model (a restricted theoretical model MT) against two alternative unrestricted models (Anderson & 
Gerbing, 1988 and Steekamp & Trijp, 1991). The relevant test statistics lead to a non-significant chi-
square difference test and an acceptance of our model. 
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Table 1: Individual path results of the hypothesized relationship between network subgroups, collaboration and performance 
 Flexibility of  
adjustments 
Joint  
Planning 
Joint  
Problem Solving 
Perceived 
Satisfaction 
Growth 
Rate 
Downstream 
subgroups 
     
Other buyers  
network subgroup 
.222** 
(2.453)        
.040 
(.490) 
         
.006 
(.075)        
  
Buyers’ customers 
network subgroup 
 
.163* 
(1.965)         
.127† 
(1.688)         
.042 
(.594)        
  
Other subgroups      
Input suppliers  
network Subgroup 
 
-.046 
(.541)         
.114 
(1.528)         
-.036 
(.509)         
  
Other PP suppliers 
network subgroup 
 
- .089 
(1.044)         
.183** 
(2.443)         
.087 
(1.231)           
  
Cooperative agents 
network subgroup 
 
.061 
(0.792)                    
-.059 
(.874)                    
-.113† 
(1.794)                   
  
Collaboration      
Flexibility of  
Adjustments 
 .371** 
(5.506) 
.579** 
(9.125) 
.222** 
(2.491) 
       
.160† 
(1.688)        
Joint Planning    .014            
(0.192) 
         
.007  
(.878)       
Joint problem  
solving 
 
    .380** 
(3.654)                  
.089 
(.946)                  
Χ2 = 26.455 (P = 0.0195) df=12; 
GFI=0.972; RMSR= 0.048; NFI=0.929 
     
 
**p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.10, two-tailed test.  
Note: Standardized estimates (γ and β) and |t-test| within parentheses. 
 
 
The model in table 1 shows the direct impact of network subgroups on relational governance and the 
indirect impact of network subgroups on performance. In reviewing the total pattern of our results, we 
note that they highlight the importance of reliable information provided by the downstream network 
subgroups of other buyers (i.e. merchant-distributors) and buyer’s customers (i.e. supermarkets and 
flower shops). Furthermore, they show the importance of flexibility to enhance performance in terms 
of sales growth and perceived satisfaction. The downstream network subgroups capture the 
information provided by other buyers and buyers’ customers that supports suppliers in defining price 
and quantities of products, coordinating the logistic and production process, and to control the actions 
of the wholesalers. By gathering such valuable information, suppliers can avoid surprises and take 
prompt action in the relationship with wholesalers, because the information originates from subgroups 
close to consumers. The action of planning together with the wholesaler requires a certain share of 
supplier’s internal information, which relies on the support of colleagues and even competitors that 
might have experienced similar situations with the same wholesaler. By analyzing the three 
dimensions of collaboration, we tested the strength of the dimensions in capturing the collaborative 
efforts. The results show us that the norm of flexibility exerts a central role for collaborative channels 
with wholesalers.   
 
5 Conclusions and managerial Implications  
Consistent with network scholars, who suggest that connections with members of the network provide 
reliable information to support a business relationship (Anderson et al, 1994, Gulati, Nohria & Zaheer, 
2000), we found interesting relations between the downstream network subgroups, collaboration and 
performance. The results support to a great extent the hypotheses derived It generally suggests that 
the studies of relationship channel should consider the implications of individual network subgroups 
on the various dimensions of collaboration and performance and moreover that, in developing 
collaborative channels with wholesalers, the building and sustaining connections with downstream 
networks is critical. This supports a process view of the business network relationships consistent with 
Granovetter’s (1985) concept of structural embeddedness. This implies that when firms are interacting 
they are engaged in network structuring at the same time as they are conditioned by the network 
structure (Burt, 1980). Two managerial implications of our study appear to be most critical. First, 
managers may use our study and its empirical evidence as a check on the adequacy of their existing 
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business network in terms of the information provided by network subgroups. Second, it is important 
for managers to have an accurate perception of the value of the information of each individual 
network subgroup. Without this, any evaluation of the costs and benefits of alternative governance 
responses based on market forces (e.g. market-based governance) and relational norms (e.g. 
relational governance) would be vague.  
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